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Settling the Score: Copyright in Modern
Editions of Public Domain Musical Works
Guillaume Laroche*
Modern sheet music publishers regularly assert copyright claims over their
new editions of public domain compositions by long-deceased composers like Mo-
zart and Chopin, yet the legal basis for these claims remains untested. This inquiry
argues that most such claims are untenable, and outlines a doctrinal copyright
analysis supporting this conclusion in Canadian law and jurisprudence. Following
a brief overview of the sheet music publishing industry’s copyright practices and
some recent challenges to its preferred status quo, two doctrinal approaches are
tested using various editions of Frédéric Chopin’s “Raindrop Prelude”. First, an
application of the doctrine of originality, as described in CCH v. Law Society of
Upper Canada, reveals that editors’ original expression in most new editions of
public domain compositions is difficult to discern. Although some editions meet the
required standard, this finding nonetheless jeopardizes many publishers’ copyright
claims. Second, the inquiry briefly investigates the nature of musical scores as
works, concluding that, contrary to what publishers have sometimes argued, a
proper application of the Copyright Act should classify them as musical works in-
stead of artistic works. Finally, the findings of the court in the British case Sawkins
v. Hyperion are applied to the Canadian context. The article concludes by discuss-
ing some of the policy implications of its findings, contrasting the benefits accruing
to musicians with the potentially harmful decisions that some music publishers
might make if the Canadian standard were adopted more widely.
Les éditeurs modernes de partitions de musique réclament régulièrement des
droits d’auteur sur leurs nouvelles éditions de compositions du domaine public de
compositeurs décédés depuis longtemps comme Mozart et Chopin. Par contre, le
fondement juridique de ces demandes demeure inéprouvé. Cette enquête fait valoir
que la plupart de ces demandes sont intenables, et trace les grandes lignes d’une
analyse doctrinale sur le droit d’auteur à l’appui de cette conclusion dans la loi et
la jurisprudence canadienne. Après un bref tour d’horizon des pratiques en matière
de droit d’auteur de l’industrie de l’édition musicale et des récents défis à son statu
quo, deux approches doctrinales sont testées au moyen de différentes éditions du
prélude de Frédéric Chopin « La goutte d’eau ». Premièrement, une application de
la doctrine de l’originalité, telle que décrite dans CCH Canadienne Limitée c. Bar-
reau du Haut-Canada, révèle que l’expression originale des éditeurs dans la
plupart des nouvelles éditions des compositions du domaine public est difficile à
* M.A. (Music), McGill University; LL.M., Osgoode Hall Law School.
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discerner. Bien que certaines éditions se conforment aux normes requises, cette
conclusion compromet néanmoins les demandes de droit d’auteur de plusieurs
éditeurs. Deuxièmement, cette enquête examine brièvement la nature des partitions
musicales en tant qu’œuvres, concluant que, contrairement à ce que certains
éditeurs ont parfois soutenu, l’application appropriée de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur
doit les classer comme des œuvres musicales et non des œuvres artistiques. Finale-
ment, les conclusions de la Cour dans la décision britannique Sawkins c. Hyperion
sont appliquées au contexte canadien. L’article conclut en discutant quelques-unes
des incidences qu’apportent ses conclusions, comparant les avantages pour les
musiciens et les décisions potentiellement endommageantes que certains éditeurs
pourraient prendre si la norme canadienne était adoptée plus largement.
1. INTRODUCTION
The place of music within copyright is an oft-explored subject in intellectual
property law. Over the past decade, scholarship on music downloading,1 digital
sampling,2 the relationship between musical creativity and copyright,3 and even
musical folklore and oral tradition4 has proliferated. These are all important areas
of research; yet, they all focus on musical composition and performance, that is, the
elaboration of works and their sounds. Comparatively little attention has been paid
to the process that mediates these two activities, namely, the creation of musical
scores, and its relationship with copyright. The above topics also tend towards con-
temporary musical issues; older music that continues to garner a significant follow-
ing has been left by the wayside in modern copyright discourse.
One could be forgiven for thinking that old “classical” music — say, that of
Beethoven and Mozart — ought to retain little attention in copyright circles. After
all, these composers’ works are in the public domain, freed from restrictions; ergo,
what does copyright have anything to do with them? But while the works of Mozart
might well be in the public domain, it remains an open question whether or not
modern editions of Mozart’s music, as represented by a recently-made musical
score, are also in the public domain. Separating the work (Mozart’s Piano Sonata
K. 330, for example) from the score of the work (the Henle-Verlag edition of Mo-
zart’s Piano Sonata K. 330) is the crucial nuance here. Music publishers argue their
new editions of Mozart’s sonatas should be protected by copyright, given the
1 For example, see Geoffrey Neri, “Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Mu-
sic Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms” (2005) 93 Geo. L.J. 733.
2 For example, see David Sanjek, “‘Don’t Have to DJ No More’: Sampling and the ‘Au-
tonomous’ Creator,” in Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds., The Construction of
Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature (Durham, NC: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 1994) 343.
3 For example, see J. Michael Keyes, “Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music
Copyright Protection” (2004) 10:4 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 407 and Andreas
Rahmatian, “Music and Creativity as Perceived by Copyright Law” (2005) 3 I.P.Q.
267.
4 For example, see Jason Toynbee, “Copyright, the Work and Phonographic Orality in
Music” (2006) 15 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 77.
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“scholarship and research”5 invested into their production, among other reasons.
These publishers’ claims have not been thoroughly tested in copyright law, given
the lack of scholarly research in the areas of modern editing and the republication
of old musical scores, as well as the paucity of jurisprudence on this topic in any
jurisdiction. To be sure, this is a remote backwood of the music and copyright
scholarship; among Canada’s leading copyright thinkers, only Vaver mentions mu-
sical scores, briefly arguing that musicologists and editors who reconstruct old
works or simplify well-known pieces for beginners are “rewarded for their skill and
judgment by a copyright in the new version” of the work.6 As will be seen, though,
neither of these examples directly addresses the most common forms of contempo-
rary music editing, so Vaver’s conclusions are regrettably of limited applicability.
For their part, neither McKeown7 nor Handa8 even mention musical scores in the
sections of their copyright treatises dedicated to musical works. Despite this lack of
detailed legal attention, scores raise fascinating questions as to where proprietary
interests in dots of ink on a page arise from. Indeed, “[c]opyright’s doctrines are
simple enough to state, but their practical application is often complex, context-
specific, and, therefore, inherently unpredictable,”9 and especially so in the case of
musical scores, where a certain level of musical sophistication is required simply to
apply copyright doctrine. In short, the topic is ripe for inquiry by both musicians
and legal academics.
I therefore pose and answer two principal questions in carrying out a doctrinal
analysis of old works republished as modern scores. First, if it is acknowledged that
Mozart (or any other long-dead composer) is the author of a musical work, but a
modern editor claims copyright in her edition of that work, on what basis is copy-
right granted? Second, since musical scores pose unresolved challenges in the ap-
plication of copyright doctrine, I ask: what does copyright tell us about originality
in musical scores, and what do musical scores tell us about originality in copyright?
I answer these questions in two broad strokes, anchoring my analysis in Canadian
law. First, I contextualize and show the importance of an inquiry such as this one
by touching on issues of copyright in scores today as they relate to the music pub-
lishing industry, musicians and the public domain. Second, based on the provisions
of the Copyright Act10 and jurisprudential guidance on how to apply its provisions
(principally from the landmark case CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper
5 Daniel Wakin, “Free Trove of Music Scores on Web Hits Sensitive Copyright Note,”
New York Times (22 February 2011) A1, online: <www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/
arts/music/22music-imslp.html>.
6 David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trademarks, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 92.
7 John McKeown, Fox Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs, 3rd ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 187–95.
8 Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in Canada (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002) at
163–7.
9 Carys J. Craig, “The Canadian Public Domain: What, Where, and to What End?”
(2010) 7 C.J.L.T. 221 at 226.
10 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 [“Copyright Act”].
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Canada11 but also other relevant sources), I undertake a detailed analysis of multi-
ple editions of one public domain work — namely, Frédéric Chopin’s Prelude in D-
flat Major — to delineate what forms of expression within those scores will or will
not likely attract copyright. I also analyze a recent British decision, Sawkins v.
Hyperion Records Ltd.,12 which dealt with the applicability of copyright to modern
editions of public domain musical works. I conclude by suggesting some conse-
quences my analysis holds for music publishers and their business methods. I argue
ultimately that publishers’ claims of copyright to these editions are not as certain as
may widely be believed, though clearly some cases deserve copyright protection.
2. CONTEXTUALIZING COPYRIGHT AND MUSIC PUBLISHING
A music publisher is an entity that “issues musical editions that consist pri-
marily of musical notation, whether for performance or study.”13 Its principal activ-
ities include “working with the composer or editor, financing the printing, promot-
ing, advertising, storing and distributing”14 a new work or a revised edition of an
old work. While a detailed presentation of publishers’ methods is beyond the scope
of this inquiry, one important fact concerns how editors and publishers prepare
modern scores of old works. Generally, editors consult special public domain edi-
tions of the works that they wish to republish.15 These special editions, termed
source scores, usually have a strong historical legacy, either because their publisher
was well-connected to the composer, or perhaps because the composer himself su-
pervised their production. From the information gathered from whatever source
scores an editor chooses to privilege, she then prepares her own layout of the mu-
sic, makes her independent editorial decisions, and the process goes ahead as de-
scribed above.
Although most of their work goes on symbiotically with the musical commu-
nities they serve, one area where music publishers encounter criticism is in their
collective enforcement of a strict copyright regime in the sheet music business. In a
particularly poignant example, a German publisher recently demanded compensa-
tion from a kindergarten for photocopying old scores and performing the works in
public.16 Publishers also assert copyright in numerous republished public domain
11 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
339 (S.C.C.) [“CCH”].
12 Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2004] EWHC 1530 (Ch.); [2004] 4 All E.R. 418
[“Sawkins”].
13 Stanley Boorman, Eleanor Selfridge-Field & Donald Krummel, “Printing and Publish-




16 “Kindergartens ordered to pay copyright for songs”, Deustche Welle (28 December
2010) online: <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14741186,00.html>. Although
the publisher is likely fully within its rights to demand so, it remains something of a
comment on its copyright priorities when even preschools do not escape unscathed.
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scores,17 perhaps legitimately sometimes, but also sometimes illegitimately, as will
be seen shortly. Their interests are also well-represented by various other musical
bodies in society. For instance, nearly all music festivals, conservatories and com-
petitions require published copies of the works being performed to be made availa-
ble for adjudication panels, with photocopies disqualifying entrants from participa-
tion, examination or competition. Consider, for example, the following notice
issued by the Royal Conservatory of Music of Toronto [RCM] in the syllabi for its
music examination candidates:
Copyright and Photocopying
Please note that photocopies will not be permitted in the examination room.
Candidates who bring photocopies to the examination will not be examined.
Composers, artists, editors and publishers rely on the sales revenues to con-
tribute to their livelihood. Photocopying music deprives the creators of due
compensation.18
This notice is odd for a number of reasons. First, the RCM is mostly in the business
of training and examining classical performers; as a matter of copyright, it is en-
tirely plausible that many of the RCM’s prescribed examination test pieces are in
the public domain — certainly not all, but definitely many.19 If so, why impose
such a blanket rule in the name of copyright, which does not apply to public do-
main works? This anomaly exposes a subtler trick in the RCM’s policy: while
“copyright” figures prominently in the title of the section of the above excerpt, the
actual policy does not concern itself in the slightest with copyright. The policy
merely describes how photocopies are never acceptable to the RCM,20 and skirts
entirely the issue of legally photocopied music, such as fair dealing,21 preferring to
deny by omission that such a thing even exists. To the non-expert reader, copyright
infringement is associated with photocopying music, without any consideration of
whether any copyright actually subsists in a given work. Worse, the policy borrows
the term “copyright” to bestow on itself a legalistic air, but then completely fails to
integrate that legal concept into its framework. Moreover, in suggesting that
17 The majority of the editions of a Chopin work consulted in Part 3 of this inquiry fea-
tured copyright notices, usually presented as a general “all rights reserved” notice
alongside the copyright symbol, laid out such that they implicitly suggest everything in
the bound volume is protected by copyright — presumably, that also being the pub-
lisher’s preferred conclusion.
18 Royal Conservatory of Music, Voice Syllabus (Mississauga: Frederick Harris Music,
1998) at 11. Emphasis in original. Other Royal Conservatory syllabi feature similar
notices.
19 Indeed, many of these works belong to the public domain, though an exhaustive proof
of this notion is not necessary in the service of the point I want to make.
20 It is worth pointing out here the RCM’s strong ties to Frederick Harris Music, a pub-
lishing company which regularly produces editions of the RCM’s most popular exami-
nation test pieces.
21 Photocopying scores for a music exam could potentially, for example, be recognized as
a permissible purpose for education under s. 29 of the Copyright Act.
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“[p]hotocopying music deprives the creators of due compensation,”22 the norma-
tive implication is that all music creators produce work that is equally cognizable
under copyright, and that all such creators are naturally owed compensation for
their work because of copyright. But copyright in fact presumes no such thing;
indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has warned that mere labour, even if under-
taken in a qualifying medium, is insufficient to attract copyright.23 As this article
shows, only some kinds of work qualify for copyright, and then only for limited
duration.
These kinds of policies that enforce a “maybe real, maybe fake” copyright
interest in every work are unfortunately all too common in the classical music
world. While these policies may represent legally prudent positions for conservato-
ries and festivals to adopt, at some point, it is also important for these bodies to
acknowledge some legal reality. Fortunately, recent innovations in sheet music dis-
tribution are starting to poke holes in publishers’ legal arguments and business
methods. For example, in 2000, the Theodore Presser Co. released a CD-ROM of
sheet music of classical songs and opera solos that are in the public domain in the
United States. The Journal of Singing hailed this “legally printable sheet music” as
an important step toward “having easy and legal access to individual arias and
songs”24 — as if the public domain magically appeared the moment a CD-ROM
with digitized copies of old scores was made available, language that further attests
to the copyright stranglehold music publishers enforce as a disciplinary norm in
musical communities. More recently, in February 2007, like the better-known Pro-
ject Gutenberg in relation to literary works, the International Music Score Library
Project [IMSLP] began digitizing and cataloguing the world’s largest collection of
public domain musical scores, with its servers hosted in Canada.25 It did not take
too long for music publishers to notice. By October 2007, the site had been taken
down as a precaution against mounting legal challenges from music publishers.26
This occurred even though, according to Michael Geist, there was “little doubt that
the site was compliant with Canadian law.”27 The publishers argued that the web-
site hurt sales of sheet music, among other alleged wrongdoing.28 The website
eventually came back online in June 2008 after publishers, rather tellingly, dropped
their suits once the site’s creator, Edward Guo, enlisted the support of both the
Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic and the Stanford Fair Use Pro-
22 Royal Conservatory of Music (1998), supra note 18 at 11.
23 CCH, at para. 21.
24 Judith Carman, “Your Own Printing Press: Legally Printable Sheet Music” (2001) 58
Journal of Singing 183 at 183-4.
25 Wakin (2011).
26 Ibid.
27 Michael Geist, “Music Copyright in the Spotlight”, BBC News (2 November 2007)
online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7074786.stm>. The interjurisdictional
complexities of the cases were slightly more complicated than I have described above;
onerous still, the website generally operated on a sound legal basis, with the few availa-
ble infringing editions promptly deleted by site management when flagged.
28 Wakin (2011).
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ject to fight the claims.29 As of April 2013, the IMSLP held over 234,000 scores,30
and it continues to grow in popularity among classical musicians as a source for
obtaining dependable editions of public domain works.31
Although de facto victorious against the music publishers’ claims of illegal
activity, the IMSLP today remains careful about the material it chooses to make
available, erring on the side of extreme caution. While it denounces practices like
“copy-fraud” in the music publishing industry, where a publisher “will reprint pub-
lic domain editions with no new editing and write ‘copyright 20XX’ even though
the work does not qualify for copyright protection,”32 its own uploading policies
steer clear of these copy-fraud editions and favour editions that are unquestionably
in the public domain according to their year of edition; indeed, most scores on the
website date from before 1910. For a supposedly sensitive challenger of copyright-
ability in old scores, the website gives a curious example of when it might choose
to not make a work available: 
Example 1: Henle published a re-engraved edition of Beethoven sonatas in
1985, with an editor who is still living. The work is not public domain be-
cause the editor is still living, and the new engraving is copyrighted.33
Strictly speaking, there is nothing in the above scenario that guarantees that Henle’s
edition attracts copyright. Treating a living editor as a de facto author whose contri-
butions are substantive enough to attract copyright is legally prudent for the
IMSLP, but it remains an open question as to whether this is the correct legal con-
clusion in Canada. Thus, some editions purport to benefit from copyright despite
the fact that a more nuanced analysis of copyright law and jurisprudence would
suggest otherwise. Publishers are quick to point to “significant changes to the mu-
sic, such as corrections and editing marks, based on years of scholarship about the
composer”34 as a justification for a renewed copyright interest in recent editions of
a given public domain work. However, the test for copyright is not whether one has
done research, corrected mistakes or even added new editing marks; it is, simply
stated, whether there is some more than trivial or de minimis original expression in
a work.35 Publishers may well be correct in their conclusions, but their reasoning as
to why they deserve a copyright is not.
Thus, finding the line where “corrections and editing marks”36 become a form
of original expression is an important goal in the classical music world today, given
the interest of websites like the IMSLP in exposing copy-fraud practices in the
29 Edward Guo, “IMSLP: Open Letter (Reopening)” IMSLP/Petrucci Music Library (29
June 2008) online: <http://imslp.org/wiki/IMSLP:Open_Letter_(Reopening)>.
30 The IMSLP home page updates the total number of scores periodically. Online:
<http://imslp.org> (accessed July 17, 2013).
31 Wakin (2011).
32 Edward Guo, “Public Domain” IMSLP/Petrucci Music Library (2011) online:
<http://imslp.org/wiki/Public_domain>.
33 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
34 Wakin (2011).
35 See CCH, at para. 16; this requirement will be discussed in greater detail in Part 3.
36 Wakin (2011).
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publishing industry and resisting the reclamation of public domain works back into
copyright’s territory. In sheet music as elsewhere, such attempts at reclamation up-
set the “balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the
creator”37 by restricting access to what ought to be a public resource. Thus, that
“the dissemination of artistic works is central to developing a robustly cultured and
intellectual public domain”38 remains a key principle here as in much other con-
temporary copyright scholarship.39
3. A DOCTRINAL COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS
As Part 2 has illustrated, the modern editing of public domain works raises
numerous questions about the nature and application of copyright to old musical
scores. To answer such queries, I propose a two-prong analysis of copyright doc-
trine in the context of musical scores. First, several editions of a work by Frédéric
Chopin are compared and their features interpreted in light of two central tenets of
copyright: originality and the nature of the work, emphasizing the former. By con-
sidering different scenarios of how expression can emerge on or in a score in the
context of these two main tenets, I show how Canadian copyright law sets a fairly
high standard of originality before editorial work may benefit from copyright.
Some scores indeed deserve copyright protection; many, however, do not. Second,
the particulars of Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd.40 are analyzed. This case, al-
though not exactly answering my questions, nonetheless provides several clues in
its adjudication of the copyright status of a modern edition of the music of French
baroque composer Michel-Richard de Lalande (1657–1726).
Frédéric François Chopin (1810–1849) composed his Prelude in D-flat Major,
op. 28 no. 15, around 1836 as part of a set of 24 preludes for solo piano (collec-
tively known as the Preludes, op. 28, published in 1839).41 This piece, sometimes
known simply as the “Raindrop Prelude”, constitutes an ideal exemplar with which
37 Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336
at para. 30 [“Théberge”].
38 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012
SCC 36, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326 at para. 10.
39 The importance of the public domain is treated in-depth by many other scholars. Suf-
fice it to say here that their various conclusions about its importance for sustaining
future creative expression apply to music as they do any other creative endeavour. See
as leading examples David Lange, “Recognizing the Public Domain” (1981) 44 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 147; Jessica Litman, “The Public Domain” (1990) 39 Emory L.J. 965;
Pamela Samuelson, “Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities”
(2003) 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 147; Teresa Scassa, “Table Scraps or a Full Course
Meal? The Public Domain in Canadian Copyright Law” in McGill University Faculty
of Law, ed., Intellectual Property at the Edge: New Approaches to IP in a Transsys-
temic World — Meredith Lectures (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2007) 347; and
Craig (2010), supra note 9.
40 Supra note 12 [“Sawkins”].
41 Maurice Brown, “The Chronology of Chopin’s Preludes” (1957) 98 The Musical
Times 423 at 423-4.
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to test copyright doctrine in musical scores, for several reasons. First, Chopin hav-
ing died in 1849, the Prelude is clearly in the public domain. Second, the work is
well-known and frequently performed by pianists of all skill levels, increasing the
likelihood of reader familiarity. Third, as a consequence of this popularity, several
publishers have prepared editions of the work, since popular works attract more
sales than unpopular ones. In preparing the analysis below, I consulted no fewer
than 15 separate editions of the piece, published between 1873 and 1997.42 The
music of Chopin is also a particularly good case study because in his day the com-
poser is known to have sold slightly varied editions of his works to various publish-
ers across Europe.43 There is, therefore, some academic debate among musicolo-
gists and music editors as to whether to grant more “authority” to an early French
edition compared to, say, a German one from the same era.44 These debates neces-
sarily inform the work of modern editors, who must decide which early publica-
tions best represent Chopin’s truest intentions. Consequently, some latitude exists
in terms of what expression to communicate in the score and scores thus necessitate
editorial choices. Therefore, while all editions present the same work, its form and
content vary slightly. But do they vary enough to attract copyright?45
(a) On Originality
The Copyright Act provides that copyright subsist “in every original literary,
dramatic, musical and artistic work.”46 Thus, only original works are eligible for
protection under copyright. However, the Act does not define what constitutes an
original work but the Supreme Court of Canada has spoken on this issue. In CCH
42 A complete bibliography is available at: <http://www.ualberta.ca/~glaroche/
IPJ1_Biblio.pdf>. Obviously, not all of these editions are in copyright. I seek only
models in these scores from which to ask interesting questions about copyright and
music, and not to determine the copyright status of each score individually.
43 See, generally, Jeffrey Kallberg, “Chopin in the Marketplace: Aspects of the Interna-
tional Music Publishing Industry in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century” (1983) 39
Notes 535.
44 To be clear, scores differ only slightly, and certainly not on the scale that one should
question whether one particular version of the work represents a revision. It is mostly
small details (slurs, dynamic markings, articulation marks, etc.) that change, not the
melodies and harmonies.
45 It is worth noting here that some elements from the score as a whole will usually attract
copyright protection, irrespective of the musical work’s underlying status. These in-
clude the title page and editor’s foreword or methodological description. Since these
elements so clearly fall under the ambit of copyright, they do not retain any further
interest here; going forward, the terms “score” or “edition” apply only to those ele-
ments of a complete edition which are unquestionably substantially republished, i.e.,
the music itself.
46 Copyright Act, s. 5(1).
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Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,47 Chief Justice McLachlin held
that: 
[A]n “original” work under the Copyright Act is one that originates from an
author and is not copied from another work. That alone, however, is not
sufficient to find that something is original. In addition, an original work
must be the product of an author’s exercise of skill and judgment. The exer-
cise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so triv-
ial that it could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise.48
An “original” work, therefore, originates from an author, is not copied from else-
where, and must be the product of non-trivial skill and judgment. If new editions of
the “Raindrop Prelude” are to qualify for copyright protection, they must pass all
steps of this basic test.
In order for one better to understand how markings and, more generally,
scores differ from one edition to another, some visual examples will provide con-
text for the analysis that follows. The first page of Chopin’s own handwritten score
of the Prelude is included as Appendix 1 for reference.49 To begin, compare the
following two editions, first a German and then an Austrian one, of the opening
few measures of the “Raindrop Prelude”:
Figure 1. Measures 1–4 of a German edition of the “Raindrop Prelude”, edited
by Hermann Keller.50
47 Again, for reference: CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC
13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.).
48 Ibid., at para. 25.
49 This is reproduced from the Paderewski edition of the Chopin Preludes. See Ignacy
Paderewski, ed., Frédéric Chopin, Fryderyc Chopin: oeuvres complètes: Préludes
(Warsaw: Fryderyk Chopin Institute, 1956) at an unnumbered page between the fore-
word and the main body of scores.
50 Frédéric Chopin, Prélude op. 28 no. 15, edited by Hermann Keller (Munich: G. Henle
Verlag, 1956) at 3.
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Figure 2. Measures 1–4 of an Austrian edition of the “Raindrop Prelude”, ed-
ited by Raoul Pugno.51
The notes recorded by these two editions are identical, whatever their visual
layout may be. The more peculiar details to analyze here are the additions in the
Austrian edition of 1) the performance direction “con espressione e semplice”
[“with expression and simplicity”] and 2) the dynamic crescendo/decrescendo
markings in measures 2 and 3 (or, conversely, their deletion from the German edi-
tion; deletion is a thorny problem to which I will return later).52 Incidentally, stem
directions in both staves also differ between the two scores, though this will have
little if any effect on a performer. What do these choices tell us about the nature of
skill and judgment in musical scores? Before this question is answered substan-
tively, it is worth noting that, whatever the conclusion reached, looking for evi-
dence of skill and judgment (or a lack of it) is a highly nuanced exercise in musical
scores. The above two scores represent something of the two extremes of the spec-
trum in terms of layout and editing choices, and yet the differences between them
51 Frédéric Chopin, Preludes, edited by Raoul Pugno (Vienna: Universal Edition, circa
1900) at 23. For the record, this edition is definitely not in copyright given the editor’s
death in 1914, but for argument’s sake we will suppose that it is. I also wish to point
out two mistakes in the score, which I will recall later: the A-flat ties in the bass part in
measure 1, and the absence of a B-flat in the bass at measure 2, beat 3.
52 I wish to clarify some musical terminology for the benefit of lay readers. A crescendo,
represented as an elongated hairpin opening right (<), indicates an instruction to gradu-
ally play at a louder volume; a decrescendo (sometimes also called diminuendo) re-
quires the opposite in gradually playing softer, and is represented by an elongated hair-
pin opening left (>). Collectively, changes of volume are known as changes of
dynamics.
A measure is a unit of musical time, represented by the space between two vertical
lines that completely cross all lines (or, more technically, staves) of a score; a bar is an
oft-used synonym for the same concept.
A stem is the vertical line that extends from notes; it may extend upwards or down-
wards, according to a complex set of rules. For our purposes, stem direction is largely
irrelevant in these scores, even though it varies widely. Granting copyrights based on
stem direction would be like granting copyrights based solely on the capitalization of
certain letters in a novel: there are prescribed rules for capitalization, but failing to
observe them should not substantially alter the text in any meaningful way, only per-
haps its legibility.
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nonetheless appear relatively minor superficially. Yet, this is precisely the kind of
detailed editorial work that publishers claim deserves copyright protection. The lo-
cus of originality, if it exists, requires a narrowing of a copyright analyst’s perspec-
tives to an incredibly detailed level if music publishers are to have any chance of
successfully claiming that they hold copyrights in these scores.
Let us momentarily reverse the two scores’ real chronology and suppose that
the more detailed Austrian version was derived from an earlier public domain edi-
tion identical to the plainer German copy above, based only on the editor’s own
intuitions and conclusions about the piece, absent any other scores to consult; in
other words, that all new markings originate from the editor. Does the inclusion of
dynamic markings and a common musical directive in Italian constitute evidence of
skill and judgment? One could argue in favour of such evidence by turning to the
Supreme Court’s definition of the terms “skill” and “judgment,” while recognizing
that the tasteful inclusion of the above markings requires, according to the court, a
“developed aptitude” and significant “discernment”53 of 19th century musical prac-
tices in order to decide which markings to include as part of a published edition.
These are not random markings; after all, notice how the crescendo/decrescendo
pattern maps onto the rise and fall of the melody in the top staff. On some level,
recognizing musical patterns and adding markings into a score to facilitate a per-
former’s understanding of these same patterns requires skill and judgment, accord-
ing to the court’s definition.
On the other hand, one could argue that the insertion of such common stock
markings and phrases shows little skill and judgment, and is thus too minimal to
attract a copyright interest. After all, the Italian phrase translates to “with expres-
sion and simplicity,” which does little to add valuable information onto the score
about the music. All things being equal, one would hope that music will normally
be performed expressively and without undue complexity. To attract copyright in
the work by stating such a requirement explicitly sets the level of “knowledge, de-
veloped aptitude or practice ability” and the “capacity for discernment”54 required
for a finding of originality at an extremely low standard. The same could be said of
the dynamic markings; it takes little skill to write in a marking to represent what
every marginally competent pianist would naturally do with the music anyway. No-
tice how Chopin saw no need to include this marking in his handwritten score.55
Such editing, in some sense, is largely akin to rewarding the correct punctuation of
a sentence in a text, or even to inserting a remark after each sentence in a children’s
book to the effect that a narrator ought pause briefly in order to mark the end of a
sentence. Though some specialized knowledge of a field’s practices would be re-
quired, wider cultural practices are generally sufficient for those in the field to
know how to perform a musical phrase in Chopin’s solo piano works, or how to
mark the end of a sentence in narrating a children’s book. Thus, while the expres-
53 CCH, at para. 16. The court defines “skill” as “the use of one’s knowledge, developed
aptitude or practiced ability” and “judgment” as “one’s capacity for discernment or
ability to form an opinion or evaluation.”
54 Ibid.
55 See the score included as Appendix 1, excerpted from the Padarewski edition (see
supra note 49).
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sion communicates something, the value of what is communicated is indeed ex-
tremely low.
The issue behind both sides of the above argument raises an interesting ques-
tion: to what extent should disciplinary norms be considered as evidence of “devel-
oped aptitude” and “discernment”56 for the purposes of evaluating the skill and
judgment in expression? In context, then: to what extent should musicians’ habits
influence how copyright applies to their work? The question emerges because the
expression under consideration is obvious and commonplace to someone acting
from within the discipline57 but may appear as incredibly specialized knowledge to
an outsider. Should a layman’s or specialist’s view be taken in analyzing claims of
skill and judgment? In my opinion, with some nuance, the former is correct. Since
an “author must contribute something intellectual to the work [. . .] if it is to be
considered original,”58 knowledge from within a discipline ought normally qualify
under the criteria of skill and judgment, given that the standard of contributing
“something intellectual” is set so low. Adding markings coherently still requires a
level of intellectual awareness about the topic at hand, even if it is not so refined as
to respect the conventions of the discipline. Hence, it also requires a modicum of
skill and judgment; that is not to say that this standard results in better editions of
Chopin’s music but it might in the right circumstances. A poignant example is a
more recent edition of the “Raindrop Prelude” by Dr. Teresa Escandon, who devel-
ops her own notation to communicate her vision of this work. It is rather strange to
behold, but nonetheless, Escandon’s expression clearly comes across as her own.
Figure 3. Measures 4–7 of the “Raindrop Prelude”, edited by Teresa
Escandon.59
Neither the squiggly line inserted between the staves on the left nor the
squiggly diagonal extension of pedal markings (straight lines with an occasional
56 CCH, at para. 16.
57 In this instance, music, but the underlying principle surely applies to many other disci-
plines, too.
58 CCH, at para. 19.
59 Frédéric Chopin, Preludes and Ballades of Frederic Chopin, edited by Teresa Escandon
(Miami: CPP/ Belwin Inc., 1994), at 34. A portion of the score, reproduced by permis-
sion of the publisher, is attached as Appendix 2 to allow for a fuller consideration of
Escandon’s method.
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indent, below the lower staff) are common musical symbols. Yet, simply from
looking at the score, given the uncommon markings, one clearly sees that skill and
judgment have played important roles here, first in developing a new notation for
musical expression, second in applying that expression throughout the Prelude. If
these more complex symbols attract copyright (and, in my opinion, they should),
common stock symbols similarly applied in an original way should, too. The fact
that someone prefers existing forms of notation instead of developing a new system
ought not to limit the applicability of copyright, which looks only for signs of origi-
nal expression, not ingenuity. As long as an editor has applied her own set of mark-
ings, and thus her own expression, to an edition of Chopin’s work, there is reason
to believe that such expression ought to be protected by copyright.
Of course, authenticity as an objective in and of itself requires that editors
ideologically respect Chopin’s views of his Prelude ahead of their own interpreta-
tion. In dealing with the originality of sets of musical or other markings, one is
faced with two other distinct editorial possibilities. First, an editor might choose to
remove markings from a source edition score, based on recent discoveries about,
say, a newfound lack of reliability in a deceased editor’s claims about his connec-
tions to the composer. Second, in what is the most common scenario today, new
editions may be produced by blending together the features of several other scores,
selectively taking markings from the beginning of a piece from one source edition,
and others from the ending of another edition. How then do originality, skill, and
judgment come into play here?
The first scenario is far from abnormal. Modern publishing houses must occa-
sionally correct the excesses of a long-deceased editor of a previously reliable first
edition based on, say, a newly discovered personal manuscript kept by the com-
poser. For example, Pugno’s earlier Austrian edition contains some mistakes;60 yet,
correcting these mistakes involves removing symbols from a page, not adding
more. Thus, peeling back previously published layers of expression can be part of a
music editor’s job. But this prospect raises a most intriguing feature of copyright
law: where does one locate evidence of skill and judgment in a new edition that
features, on the whole, less material on the page than that seen in the public domain
version of the same work? It is a problem fairly unique to musical scores, since few
other kinds of works almost routinely need to have material removed in order to
arrive at a more “authentic” edition of a text. This situation is difficult to analogize
to anything the Supreme Court of Canada has dealt with in copyright. Although
CCH discusses copyright in headings and summaries of court decisions, something
new and distinct is created in the process of writing those fragments of text; they
are not derived by simply paring down a judicial decision until nothing but a few
words or sentences are left. Identifying the locus of an editor’s expression when
material is removed from a page is inherently difficult but leads to interesting ob-
servations about the nature of copyright. I return to this topic shortly.
Let us meanwhile briefly consider the main arguments for and against copy-
right. An argument in favour of the originality of a less-marked score has some
grounding in the definitions that the Supreme Court offers of the terms “skill” and
“judgment.” It is entirely plausible that, in doing his work, an editor might use his
60 See supra note 51.
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“knowledge, developed aptitude or practiced ability” in deciding to exclude some
marking or component as part of the work he edits; doing so might even reflect
favourably on his “capacity for discernment.”61 By the Supreme Court’s own met-
rics, these activities appear to be of the right kind. The problem, of course, is that
while there may be skill and judgment (and thus originality) in this decisional pro-
cess, it is difficult to identify and isolate the original expression that emerges from
this process or the resulting product. Indeed, if one is simply not reproducing sym-
bols on a page, whatever the reason, one is in fact only re-copying a public domain
work, albeit a materially impoverished version of it. Though the rationale that justi-
fies it may be different, the process itself resembles the “purely mechanical exer-
cise” that the Supreme Court warns against.62 While there is undoubtedly labour
expended in creating such a score, it appears that it is not of the right kind. After
all, all the Supreme Court notes that the relationship between labour and copyright
“should not be interpreted as concluding that labour in and of itself could ground a
finding of originality.”63 Editors that only strip away markings from previous
scores should beware.
It is worth pausing to consider more fully the implications of this conclusion
for the music publishing industry, and what it says about the nature of copyright.
By only crediting expression that appears tangibly on a page, copyright mandates
that destructive original expressive acts64 are not granted equal protection as crea-
tive expressive acts, despite the fact that both may be generated from equal invest-
ments of originality, skill and judgment. The requirement to supply something new
as opposed to something better to benefit from copyright thus has two principal
consequences in music publishing. First, it encourages the continuous addition of
markings, editorial notes, etc. into republished sheet music so as to attract maximal
copyright protections. On this reasoning, the score shown earlier produced by Dr.
Teresa Escandon is likely among the most impervious of Chopin scores to claims
of non-copyrightability, because of all the unconventional squiggly lines that in-
habit her edition. However, an editor who, two centuries from now, discovers Dr.
Escandon’s edition as the sole surviving record of the “Raindrop Prelude” and de-
cides to republish the work without Escandon’s squiggly lines65 based on his skill
and judgment would not receive any copyright protection, despite independently
applying much of same kinds of skills and judgment as Escandon in deciding what
belongs and what does not, and arguably producing a more “authentic” edition of
Chopin’s work in doing so. It is worth pondering the extent to which this is what
we seek to encourage with our copyright regime.
The second conclusion to be drawn here is, in some sense, a further abstrac-
tion of the first, as a feature of copyright not often acknowledged but on prime
display here: for all the considerations of “the public interest in promoting the en-
61 CCH, at para. 16.
62 Ibid., at para. 25.
63 Ibid., at para. 21.
64 By which I mean the removal of expression as an expressive act in and of itself.
65 Assuming of course that, perhaps unsurprisingly, he works under a copyright regime
which is substantially similar to that of today.
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couragement and dissemination of works of art and intellect”66 (in Canada) or the
need “to promote the progress of science and useful arts”67 (in the United States)
which are invoked to justify the existence of copyright, there is little connection
between copyright and the veracity or authenticity of the expression it protects.
Copyright concerns itself mostly with protecting originality as a creative act. This
situation creates a perverse incentive for those, like many music publishers and
other specialized kinds of literary and artistic publishers, in the business of publish-
ing the most “authentic” copies of works. In order to benefit from copyright protec-
tion, “authenticity” in a new edition must be rooted in some tangibly visible crea-
tive act, as opposed to a destructive one. Music publishers seeking to guarantee
copyrights in their scores therefore have an economic incentive to tilt the scale of
“authenticity” ever higher toward adding things to a page, lest the photocopying of
the fruits of their labour be permitted moments after a new release is placed on the
market. Authenticity derived from the removal of markings is much riskier, be-
cause of the absence of evidence on the page that some act of original expression
occurred. For those not concerned with authenticity, the road to a secured copyright
lies in littering a score with as much unquestionably original material as possible.
This analysis perhaps explains in part why some editions, such as this compara-
tively recent one by Désiré N’Kaoua, add ever greater quantities of text and de-
scriptions into their scores:
Figure 4. Measures 17–20 of the “Raindrop Prelude”, edited by Désiré
N’Kaoua (1992).68
66 Théberge, at para. 30.
67 U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 8.
68 Frédéric Chopin, Préludes, edited by Désiré N’Kaoua (Paris: Henry Lemoine, 1992), at
25.
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The written explanations here act like footnotes as evidence of original work
by the editor, and situate that evidence prominently on the musical score itself. In
older editions, remarks about the historical basis of the proposed fingering were
confined to appendices at the back of the book. But a copyright system that rewards
evidence of original acts on a page ahead of any other criterion shifts incentives
and leads to more text and expression marked on the score itself. This may indeed
in part explain why some editions, such as Schirmer’s editions of J.S. Bach’s
(1685–1750) “Inventions and Sinfonias”, include many expressive markings con-
trary to the generally accepted stylistic musical practices:69 doing this was visibly
original, enough to practically guarantee a copyright in the score.
If one, however, returns to the purposes of copyright, it is difficult to see what
kind of public interest is served and which arts are advanced when copyright, no
doubt unintentionally, does more to reward the work of those who would indiscrim-
inately scribble doodles onto a public domain work, and then republish it with addi-
tional protection accorded to their “valuable” original expression, than the work of
those who focus on building a better version of Chopin’s, Bach’s, Ibsen’s or Kant’s
works. To return to my original point, then, under its current configuration, copy-
right is a system that always rewards new ahead of better, and it is therefore at best
doubtful if copyright always serves the interests it was intended to promote for both
the public and authors.70
Let us now return to the second scenario described earlier. What should be
made of cases where an editor consults numerous source scores, compares their
contents, then comes up with her own unique set of markings based on the various
options, while never creating any markings that cannot be traced to one source
score or another? Should this kind of work qualify as original expression? On the
one hand, none of the expression on the page comes from the editor herself. On the
other hand, the kind of skill and judgment required to make such expressive deci-
sions is largely akin to that seen earlier with the editor who inserted her own mark-
ings: one must decide on the reasonableness of all markings individually based on
one’s knowledge, consider the various options available for editing the score, then
finally make decisions about which markings are most useful, given available re-
search, documents and the craft of music performance of the day. Done right, it is
not a “purely mechanical exercise” involving only the transcription of musical data
from one page to another, a process that the Supreme Court warns against.71 The
synthesis of various markings into a new edition in some sense requires the same
kind of skill and judgment as that associated with the selection and/or arrangement
69 See Johann Sebastian Bach, Fifteen Three-Part Inventions for Piano, edited by F.
Busoni (New York: Schirmer, 1926); and Johann Sebastian Bach, Fifteen Two-Part
Inventions for Piano, edited by F. Busoni (New York: Schirmer, 1927).
70 Michael Birnhack arrives at a similar idea by a different path (though he structures his
dichotomy as “more or better” instead of “new or better”), and follows through with
several of its economic and democratic consequences. See, generally, Michael
Birnhack, “More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain” in L. Guibault & P.B.
Hugenholtz, eds., The Future of the Public Domain (Netherlands, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2006) 59.
71 CCH, at para. 25.
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of materials in building an original compilation;72 none of the materials themselves
is original, but their original presentation in some new format merits copyright
protection.
Categorizing such editions as compilations might indeed be the most solid
ground on which to certify that a score developed as described above is copyright-
able. After all, the editor marks no original expression of her own in such cases, but
rather determines which of others’ expressions are most appropriate for inclusion in
her edition. There is, however, a possible statutory obstacle to overcome: the Copy-
right Act specifically defines a compilation as “a work resulting from the selection
or arrangement of [. . .] musical or artistic works or parts thereof.”73 The word
“works” in the plural underscores the notion that compilations in copyright usually
draw from distinct sources in producing a new whole; it is unclear whether differ-
ent editions of Chopin’s Prelude in D-flat Major constitute separate works or sim-
ply multiple versions of the same single work. A “normal” compilation of scores of
the “Raindrop Prelude” would result in a dozen or so distinct editions being repub-
lished as a set, perhaps titled “Twelve Editions of Chopin’s ‘Raindrop Prelude’”.
But is it still a compilation where small details and/or parts of each of those scores
(“parts thereof”) are used to create one version of a work? After all, there are usu-
ally striking differences of scale between a work and a compilation in which that
same work might feature. Albums titled “Chopin’s Greatest Works” or “The Best
Classical Music” may include Chopin’s famous Prelude, but the compilation is sev-
erable into its constituent works. This is not so, though, where a compilation of
editions of Chopin’s “Raindrop Prelude” is presented as one score of the same Pre-
lude. Applying the statute in this way leads to the somewhat awkward position that
a musical work protected by copyright may be its own compilation, possibly re-
cycled ad infinitum by a publisher from time to time in order to renew copyright in
the work.
It is difficult to judge if this is an acceptable definition of a compilation ac-
cording to Parliament’s intent, or an abuse of the provisions of the Copyright Act in
a way never intended by Parliament. In my opinion, however, copyright in a com-
pilation is granted on the selection and arrangement of individually severable and
identifiable works which can be easily isolated from one another so as to determine
what exactly the compilation consists of. Because musical scores that compile vari-
ous markings from other sources do not present their findings in a way that allows
for a clear delineation of what has been compiled from where, it is difficult to as-
certain a priori their status as compilations. If one can find no clear evidence in the
work of such a status, then one should not allow the definition of compilation to
apply, even though the process may involve steps similar to that of building a com-
pilation. On the whole, then, if an editor contributes no new expression and only
rearranges the expression offered by others into a new format and presents this as
72 As per the Copyright Act, s. 2, a copyright may be granted for compiling a selection of
materials, and arranging them in a non-obvious way; this copyright is held only for the
compilation itself, and not the materials compiled. See the next paragraph for statutory
details.
73 Ibid.
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one score, the availability of copyright for compilations should not be invoked to
attract copyright to the new work.
(b) Classification of Scores as Works
One underlying issue not yet fully addressed is a basic yet not at all straight-
forward question: if a musical score is a “work” according to the Copyright Act,
then what kind of work is it? The intuitive view suggests it clearly ought to be a
musical work, because the information on the page details a musical event. This is
so intuitive a view that, when the question of if a score constitutes a musical work
was put before the England Court of Appeal, the analysis provided by the Lords
Justices Court was: “why not? [. . .] Why is that not music?”74
Lay persons could thus be excused for thinking there could be no alternatives.
Yet, publishers have sometimes argued otherwise.75 Specifically, publishers’ use of
the term “engraving” to described the physical layout of a score on a page, as well
as the process by which scores were up until quite recently physically made (that is,
as impressions of an engraving on paper),76 suggests an appeal to the category of
artistic rather than musical work. After all, section 2 of the Copyright Act plainly
lists engravings as an acceptable type of artistic work.77 The advantage in using
this kind of language in the industry is that, should a defence of the copyrightability
of a score fail on musically expressive grounds, the design of the engraving may act
as a fail-safe by presenting the score as a visual work of art. Of course, if this is
possible, then there is no reason that a score could not also be seen as a compilation
of a musical work (the sound) and an artistic work (the design of the engraving),
under the provisions of section 2.1(1) of the Copyright Act; the question then would
be to see if the “category making up the most substantial part of the compilation”78
would be musical or artistic.
What should be made of such an argument? In one sense, this is a question of
whether to privilege the form or function of dots of ink of a white page as copy-
right-protected work. Strictly speaking, by form, I mean that the dots of ink on a
musical score become lines, shapes, and all the other basic ingredients of the visual
arts, as there is some appeal in their visual presentation and layout. But to look at a
musical score this way ignores the reason ink is pressed onto a page in the first
74 Hyperion Records Ltd. v. Sawkins, [2005] EWCA Civ. 565, aff’g Sawkins, supra note
12, at para. 37: “The next question is whether the performing editions are ‘musical’
works within the meaning of the 1988 Act. A first reaction (and a reasonable one, in
my view) is to ask: why not? If the creative work contributed by Dr. Sawkins, as evi-
denced by his scores of the performing editions, enables musicians to participate in the
organised production of combinations of sound, why is that not music?”
75 Although a record company rather than a music publisher, for example, Hyperion made
such arguments in Sawkins at first instance and on appeal, arguing that scores do not
qualify as musical works.
76 See, generally, Boorman, Selfridge-Field & Krummel [nd], and specifically Paul
Hume, “Engravers Still Make Music as J.S. Bach Did” (1962) 48 Music Editors Jour-
nal 82, for the history and practice of score engraving.
77 Copyright Act, s. 2, def. “artistic work”.
78 Ibid., s. 2.1(1).
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place. People do not purchase scores mainly for the beauty of their visual designs,79
but rather for the information about the sounds that the ink conveys, i.e., its func-
tion as a symbol of music. Whatever technical merits the argument of seeing scores
as engravings may hold based on industrial processes, these ought to be rejected on
the basis that, at its core, copyright exists to protect expression. What is it that dots
of ink on a page arranged into a musical score express? Music, of course. Dots
express music and, as such, the work ought to be understood as belonging to the
category of musical work for copyright purposes. To pretend otherwise is to bend
copyright doctrine in ways contrary to its fundamental goals. Consequently, even
though publishers may claim originality and thus copyright in the design of a score
independently of a score’s contents, such rationales ought to be rejected doctrinally
because they fail to isolate the expressive dimension of what is being protected
under copyright. Thus, simply re-engraving a public domain work, perhaps chang-
ing the font or size of the notation, should be viewed along the lines of a “purely
mechanical reproduction”80 and discredited from attracting copyright on that basis.
To close my doctrinal analysis of copyright claims in republished public do-
main musical works, it seems that the Canadian legal standard of copyrightability
represents a fairly steep hill for publishers to climb. Given the requirement of a not
inconsequential amount of originality in their contributions, editors who tweak only
a few details here and there — as seen in the great majority of the scores con-
sulted — would likely fail the test of copyrightability in a musical work, unless
markings could be shown to have been independently derived by an editor. Nor is
their appeal to the visual arts as a special category of artistic works for copyright
purposes likely to receive much sympathy. Only editions that clearly show some
evident personal contribution, such as that of Dr. Teresa Escandon, approach the
standards set out by the Copyright Act and Supreme Court of Canada in the case of
Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd.
Some mention should be made of the conclusions reached in the judgment of
Patten J. in Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd. [“Sawkins”]. The central issue to be
determined was “whether the production of a new performing edition of an existing
score is capable of vesting in the editor copyright in the musical work.”81 While the
case remains merely persuasive in Canadian law because of its British origins, Pat-
ten J.’s judgment, upheld by the Court of Appeal, nonetheless remains noteworthy
in supporting this inquiry’s conclusions.
In that case, Dr. Lionel Sawkins, a world expert on the music of Michel-Rich-
ard de Lalande (1657–1726), prepared new editions of four works by Lalande for a
79 Some exceptions might be made for select works by composers such as Erik Satie
(Three Pieces in the Shape of a Pear) and George Crumb (“The Magic Circle of Infin-
ity” from Makrokosmos), in which the visual aesthetic of the score plays an important
expressive role in the music itself. Suffice it to say that these are especially tricky cases
for a doctrinal copyright analysis seeking to classify the nature of a work.
80 CCH, at para. 16.
81 Sawkins, at para. 12. The case was appealed by Hyperion in Hyperion Records Ltd. v.
Sawkins, supra note 74, where the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision and reasoning
of Justice Patten. As such, I use the more detailed trial level decision here in deci-
phering British copyright law’s requirements.
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choir in London, starting in 1999.82 The choir later recorded these works for a CD
release by Hyperion Records Ltd. Dr. Sawkins insisted that his work on the editions
ought to grant him more than an editor’s fee and claimed that he held an authorial
copyright interest in the editions used to produce Hyperion’s recordings, thus de-
serving royalties at Hyperion’s authorial rates. For its part, Hyperion insisted that
the works of Lalande were in the public domain and that Sawkins was not an author
under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (U.K).83 Thus, while the case
deals with royalty payments, the court had to address the rights of editors as au-
thors. The decision is marked by a careful parsing of the various kinds of editorial
activities that Dr. Sawkins undertook in preparing new editions of Lalande’s work.
Patten J. considered whether expression includes “items such as the figuring of the
bass, ornementation and performance directions or is really limited for copyright
purposes to the notes on the score” such that only a “significant rearrangement of,
or significant addition to, the melody will create a new copyright in the edition.”84
The judge began his analysis by approvingly quoting from the late Laddie J., a
leading intellectual property judge. Patten J. thus noted that, in dealing with a musi-
cal work in copyright law, “what it sounds like matters more than the notes” on the
score.85 Therefore, following Laddie J.’s logic, the relevance of the ornementations
and performance directions must be evaluated only insofar as they substantially
changed the sound of a musical performance. While certainly an acceptable stan-
dard, this approach suggests that copyright in musical works subsists only in the
sound itself. This is debatable, given that one can infringe a musical copyright by
photocopying a score or by merely downloading a popular song as an MP3, without
any requirement that sound be produced as part of the infringement. There is also
nothing in section 3(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 that strictly
alludes to sound in musical works.86
Whatever his initial predisposition, though, Patten J. drew the line between
copyrightable editorial work and non-copyrightable work on two bases: first, the
amount of re-composition in a given piece; second (and somewhat surprisingly), on
the amount of bass figuration included. Of the four works contested in the suit, only
82 The fact pattern is summarized from paragraphs 1–12 of Patten J.’s decision, ibid.
83 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (U.K.), c. 48.
84 Sawkins, at para. 54. To clarify the terms here, bass figuration is a system of musical
notation by which specific harmonies (that is, a combination of multiple notes) can be
indicated to a musician by notating only the lowest note of the harmony alongside a
series of numbers; each series of numbers symbolizes a different harmony over this
bass note. As such, players can quickly identify a harmony based only on the lowest
pitch and the accompanying set of numbers. Thus, an indication of “G 5-3” would lead
to a different harmony than the annotation “G 7,” itself different from “G 4-2.” With
practice, a musician can learn to harmonize without the figurations (numbers) added in,
based on established patterns. Harmonic notation for some instrumental parts in this
way was common in Lalande’s day. Ornementation is the decoration of prolonged
notes by the use of trills, vibratos and other pitches close to the sustained tone.
85 Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, cited in Sawkins, at para. 55.
86 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 (U.K.), c. 48, s. 3(1): “musical work’ means
a work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action intended to be sung,
spoken or performed with the music.”
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one required re-composition by Dr. Sawkins of some inner orchestral parts which
were lost in the original source editions,87 and “these recreated passages are suffi-
cient in themselves to create a separate copyright in favour of Dr. Sawkins.”88 This
is not a particularly surprising conclusion. Musical composition itself has long been
recognized as an original creative act, even in the imitation of someone else’s style;
it is why the concept of a musical work exists in the first place. Still, this suggests
that, the moment an editor composes or re-composes portions of a work, a new
copyright should apply.89
More interesting is Patten J.’s analysis of the originality of figured bass nota-
tions. His analysis here confirms the basic principles of my earlier discussion on
the nature of copyright in edits which reflect knowledge that is commonplace to
those in the musical world, while appearing specialized to those outside it. Hype-
rion argued that figuring a bass was not a protectable expression on a score, on the
basis that players in a rehearsal would have no need of such notations, because they
could themselves create the same harmonies, and do so without the figurations;
essentially, “performers could have, by their own efforts, achieved the same re-
sult.”90 Patten J. dismissed this analysis, saying that Sawkins’ efforts in figuring
the bass created a certain kind of sound — harmony, in that instance — which is
essential to the “proper realisation” of the baroque music of Lalande.91 Patten J.
rejected the argument “that changes or additions to the figured bass are not capable
of adding qualitatively to the musical work,”92 and on this basis awarded Dr.
Sawkins a copyright interest in two additional works. The message seems to be
that, if editorial work has the potential to change the sound substantially, whether
or not performers would come to the same interpretative conclusion as the editor,
such markings may be sufficient to attract copyright. At the same time, it is worth
noting that bass figurations affect the harmonies (that is, the notes of a musical
work), as opposed to the volume, expressive style, or other non-pitch based musical
elements. In this regard, Sawkins’ editing differs substantially from that seen earlier
in scores of Chopin’s music.
On that point, Patten J.’s remarks on the last remaining score that Dr. Sawkins
submitted for consideration are most illuminating. Patten J. rejected Sawkins’ claim
of copyright in that score on the basis that Sawkins’ corrections and edits were all
to elements which did not substantially affect the sound of the piece, and were too
few in number.93 In Lalande’s “Sacris Solemnis”, Sawkins corrected only a few
pitches, added one correction to the figuring, and inserted a few additional perform-
87 By “re-composition,” I mean that portions of Lalande’s work needed to be completed
by Dr. Sawkins, who composed music in the style of Lalande to fill in gaps.
88 Sawkins, at para. 64.
89 This is useful in cases such as modern completions of Mozart’s Requiem, K.626.
Mozart left the work unfinished at his death; through the ages, various musicologists
have offered different completions of the work. Patten J. indirectly confirms that their
work ought to receive a copyright interest.
90 Sawkins, at para. 65.
91 Ibid., at para. 65.
92 Ibid., at para. 67.
93 Ibid., at para. 66.
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ance directions; given this, Patten J. ruled that there was no “taking of a substantial
part” of Dr. Sawkins’ work when Hyperion produced a recording of this piece.94
Patten J.’s decision implies that an editorial copyright may arise only where the
number of corrections is sufficiently great to constitute a new kind of expression.
Admittedly, this is a difficult standard to meet for editors of Chopin’s works, who
are (and should be) mostly content to reproduce all the notes exactly as in previous
editions, only tweaking various performance directions. Thus, it seems that Patten
J. applied an even more rigorous standard than I would in deciding upon the valid-
ity of non-pitch based corrections in deserving copyright. Patten J.’s line is fairly
clear: if editorial work changes pitches, either melodically or as part of the har-
mony, the result is copyrightable. Otherwise, the standard of editing is fixed suffi-
ciently high for minor editorial corrections and suggestions not to qualify for copy-
right protection.
4. CONCLUSIONS
What is one to make of the copyright status of editions of Chopin’s “Raindrop
Prelude” and other classical works in Canada? On the whole, while, in some cases,
it may be plausible to argue that an editor’s contributions of original expression are
substantial enough to clear all statutory hurdles and attract a legitimate copyright
interest, Canadian law and jurisprudence currently stack the deck against this possi-
bility. Some truly novel editions, best represented by Dr. Teresa Escandon’s exem-
plar, qualify for copyright, but those editions that make only marginal contributions
are probably — save the title page, editorial remarks and other substantially origi-
nal materials — not entitled to the benefits of copyright in the main body of scores,
contrary to publishers’ claims. This position is more generous than that offered by
the leading case dealing with copyright in modern editions of public domain works.
On Patten J.’s standard from Sawkins, perhaps not even Dr. Escandon’s edition
would secure a copyright, given how few pitch changes she makes.
I am of two minds about this conclusion. On the one hand, showing a detailed
legal rationale as a push-back against publishing houses that, without challenge,
abuse or manipulate the provisions of copyright for financial gain may signal forth-
coming victories for users’ rights and the public domain. Gaining greater accessi-
bility to music’s cultural legacy is unquestionably good.95 The above analysis also
helps define the application of copyright to musical scores, while also revealing
some of the limits and unintended consequences of copyright as they apply to the
medium. This was seen in the earlier discussion of how publishers of “authentic”
editions of Chopin or others are less likely to attract copyright due to the nature of
the publishers’ work. This is the downside of the analysis: it reveals how the core
94 Ibid.
95 For example, both James Boyle and Siva Vaidhyanathan detail several examples of
how music’s cultural legacy influences and inspires contemporary artists. See James
Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2008) at chapter 6 (“I Got a Mashup”), and Siva Vaidhyanathan,
Copyrights and Copywrongs: the Rise of Intellectual Property and How it Threatens
Creativity (New York: New York University Press, 2001) at chapter 4 (“Hep Cats and
Copy Cats”).
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values of copyright, namely that of originality in expression, are fundamentally
misaligned with those of industries predicated on publishing “authentic” editions.
One questions if copyright is as ideal a mechanism for promoting these kinds of
works as is generally assumed.
There are consequences for everyday musicians in all of this. For example,
some music publishers have invited distinguished musicians to edit collections of
repertoire in their area of specialization, in order to record their ideas and strategies
for other musicians’ benefit. Hence, Ignacy Paderewski, the great pianist renowned
for his performances of Chopin, produced an edition of this composer’s complete
works.96 But if copyrightable expression in music publishing is limited only to
pitch-based dimensions, as Patten J. believes, publishers may produce less of these
editions, because performers like Paderewski to offer performance suggestions of
how to play Chopin’s works rather than rewrite the score. There is value in preserv-
ing great musicians’ ideas on sheet music; but the required standard of revision or
expression necessary to secure a copyright may render it financially impractical for
music publishers to dedicate resources to this kind of project. After all, without
copyright, anyone could photocopy such a new score the moment it hit store
shelves, jeopardizing the publisher’s profitability.
My application of copyright doctrine to these works would, however, allow
for the cheaper printing and distribution of music across society, as more of what is
currently produced would belong in the public domain. A vibrant public domain
requires its works to be accessible to the public not just in theory, but also in prac-
tice,97 and more sheet music would be more widely available (albeit without its
cover or editorial remarks). Although it is difficult to predict exactly what publish-
ers might do in this kind of business climate, it is almost certain that many would
need to revise their core business practices. Nonetheless, musicians would clearly
benefit from a wider societal recognition of public domain sheet music and its more
widespread availability. There are nevertheless solutions elsewhere that aim to bal-
ance such competing interests. For example, countries like Germany98 and the
United Kingdom99 grant new editions of public domain works 25 years of copy-
right protection from the date of publication. Such terms encourage publishers peri-
odically to update their catalogues, while not ignoring the need for classical works
in the public domain to be readily accessible to the public. Such an approach better
incentivizes valuable republished editions while maintaining and recognizing ac-
96 Frédéric Chopin, Fryderyc Chopin: oeuvres complètes, edited by Ignacy Paderewski
(Warsaw: Fryderyk Chopin Institute, 1956).
97 Among others, Lawrence Lessig outlines several legal and cultural justifications in
light of his work preparing for Eldred v. Ashcroft. See, generally, Lawrence Lessig,
Free Culture (New York: Penguin, 2004) at chapters 13 and 14, and especially
225–228.
98 Guo, “Public Domain” (2011): “As per Article 70 of the German Urheberrechtsgesetz
(copyright law), scientic editions, which is to say editions which are produced as a
result of scientic analysis (i.e. scholarly or critical editions and urtext), have a copyright
length of only publication + 25 years.”
99 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (U.K.), c. 48, s. 15, grants copyright in a
“typographical arrangement of published editions” for 25 years.
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cess to the public domain as a goal in itself. However, Canada has no comparable
provision within its Copyright Act.
To finally answer the questions that began this inquiry: on what basis is copy-
right to be granted in modern editions of public domain musical works? It seems
that substantial, visible originality on the page is the only certain way to achieve
this, whether by the introduction of new pitches, symbols or textual remarks into
the score so as to provide a written tangible expression of some explanation of a
musical detail. Second, what does copyright tell us about originality in musical
scores, and what original things do musical scores tell us about copyright? Scores
reveal the importance of carefully considering the nature of written expression,
what symbols (musical or otherwise) represent to both learned and lay audiences,
and how symbols come to project sufficient meaning to qualify as forms of original
expression. This mechanism, while generally understood, could still be better de-
fined in Canadian copyright law. After all, most of the conclusions reached in this
inquiry rely on more or less abstract extensions of existing jurisprudence; few are
confirmed by actual decisions.
Only one thing is certain: musical scores present under-explored yet intriguing
questions in copyright law. They deserve more attention in both legal and musical
academic circles.
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Appendix 1
Chopin’s personal handwritten score of the “Raindrop Prelude”, as reproduced
in Frédéric Chopin, Fryderyc Chopin: oeuvres complètes: Préludes, edited by Ig-
nacy Paderewski (Warsaw: Fryderyk Chopin Institute, 1956) at an unnumbered
page between the foreword and the main body of scores.
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Appendix 2
An excerpt of the “Raindrop Prelude” as edited by Dr. Teresa Escandon. Re-
produced by permission of the publisher from Frédéric Chopin, Preludes and Bal-
lades of Frederic Chopin, edited by Teresa Escandon (Miami: CPP/ Belwin Inc.,
1994) at 34-35.
110   INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL [26 I.P.J.]
